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1 Introduction
Fisheries management problems have recently been linked to a reliance on overly simplistic
models of marine ecosystems. Single-species management principles that ignore complex
biological interactions among multiple species, or multiple age cohorts, and treatment of
spatially heterogeneous fish metapopulations as a spaceless whole stocks are examples.1 A
similar critique can be leveled at models of fishing behavior which often exhibit a considerable
disconnect between fundamentals, prices, technologies, stock conditions and regulations, and
the fishing outcomes that are of interest to managers. At the least, eﬀective management of
fisheries requires information on stocks-specific harvests across space and time, information
on bycatch and at-sea discarding, behavioral responses to prices and regulations, and tools to
evaluate biological and economic performance of alternative regulatory policies. An essential
requirement is that behavioral models be capable of examining the counterfactual, i.e., the
behavioral responses of fishermen to regulations that have yet to be adopted. The problem
calls for a structural approach that can link management-relevant fishing outcomes to the
complex ecological, institutional and economic conditions in marine fisheries.
This paper introduces a novel approach to study the policy-relevant aspects of fishing
behavior within a biologically and spatially heterogeneous fishery.2 Commercial fishermen
decide where and when to fish jointly with choices of factor inputs to employ in the harvesting
process and the quantity and mix of individual fish species or sub-stocks to harvest. These
choices are constrained by the available technology, the composition of the fish stocks and
often by various harvest regulations. We introduce a structural economic model that takes
as the unit of analysis the spatial harvest and discard choices of fishermen. The model draws
heavily on the neo-classical theory of the firm, but is modified to account for the role of the in
situ fish stocks in the technology. We consider multiple-species, and/or multiple age cohort
stocks that are spatially and temporally heterogeneous, and therefore make considerable
1A growing view among fisheries scientists and marine ecologists is that a more holistic approach will
improve the management of ocean fisheries resources (Brodziak and Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004; U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). The challenges and opportunities that accompany spatial fisheries
management are discussed in Wilen (2004).
2Berrmann (2007) discusses the various limitations of the random utility model for analyzing spatial
fishing behavior. See also Curtis and McConnell (2004).
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progress toward incorporating the ecological complexity of real world fisheries.
A key element of our model is a latent vector of target-cost-minimizing harvest shares.
This vector summarizes spatial-temporal stock conditions and importantly the spatial-temporal
profit opportunities for fishermen. The latent cost share vector provides the crucial link be-
tween the technology and the spatially and temporally heterogeneous fish stock. A second
key feature is the technology itself, which we assume exhibits a weak-output disposibility
property consistent with costly targeting in multiple-species fisheries (Turner, 1995; Singh
andWeninger, 2009). Third, our approach controls directly for eﬀects of regulations common
in managed fisheries on fishing behavior.
An application to the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is presented to demonstrate the key
attributes. The Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is a multiple-species fishery that is managed
with seasonal closures for some species stocks, per-trip catch limits, spatial closures, gear
restrictions and catch quotas. These regulations along with the weak output disposibility
technology lead to a complex decision environment which interacting constraints on the
harvest choices of fishermen. Our econometric model incorporates these constraints, in the
form of unique Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions, in the estimation of a parametric multiple-
product cost function. The system of estimating equations identifies further the latent stocks
conditions that determine the cost structure across space and time. A Gibbs sampler is used
to fit the model (see Casella and George, 1992 and Geweke et al., 1999).
Our analysis of reef fish harvest behavior demonstrates several of the model’s strengths.
We are able to show how prices, and regulation such as per-trip landings limits used to
reduce fishing mortality, redirect fishing eﬀorts toward unregulated species and across space
and time. Spatial-temporal discard patterns are also impacted by price and regulatory
changes. Our model predicts that when the price of fuel rises, reef fish fishermen are less
inclined to target higher priced reef fish species, and instead are more inclined to land a
harvest mix with low targeting costs. The preferred harvest strategy under higher fuel prices
also involves fewer at-sea discards.
Before we present the model and empirical results, it is instructive to compare our ap-
proach with related literature. Our model is similar in spirit to state space modeling (see
Geweke and Tanizaki, 2001 and for ecological applications see Punt and Hilborn, 1997).
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Ecologists have long relied on state-space models to estimate latent fish biomass and its
underlying dynamics. We do not explicitly model stocks dynamics here; extensions of the
model in this direction are discussed in the concluding section. We do adopt some of the
econometric techniques used in the ecology literature. Recent advances have shown that
Bayesian state space models perform better in the estimation of highly non linear dynamic
such as the logistic growth function, which features many fish ecosystems (Wang, 2007).
Current methods for analyzing spatial fishing patterns rely almost entirely on the discrete
choice random utility construct.3 A standard application of random utility models (RUMs)
to spatial fishing behavior assumes that on each trip from port, the fisherman selects, from
among a set of spatially disjoint (discrete) fishing opportunities or sites, the opportunity
that yields the highest utility.4 Our model also exploits the heterogeneity of the ocean
environment for determining spatial behavior, but we do not discretize space or time. The
number of sites at which fishermen might deploy gear in a fishery is typically far too large to
be estimated via a multinomial probit or multinomial logit specification. This places artificial
limits on the number of sites for which preferences may be estimated and forces researchers to
assume coarse geographical divisions of the fishing grounds, with coarse descriptions of spatial
fishing patterns (Berman, 2007).5 Our approach of treating space and time continuously is
therefore an important advance.
Moreover, application of the RUM to fishing data takes as the unit of analysis the spatial
location of a fishing trip. A second-stage model of input and output choices on each trip is
required by the researcher in order to complete the link between fundamentals and harvests,
bycatch revenues and costs. Our model considers the choice of spatial location jointly with
the input and harvest choices that are made on the trip. As we demonstrate, this allows us
3The random utility model (RUM) was developed by Daniel McFadden to study transportation choices.
The original set up assumes that a particular transportation choice yields utility U which is known fully by
the decision maker. Utility is decomposed as U = V + e, where V is observable by the researcher, while e
captures an unobserved component. In empirical applications V may be conditioned on observables such as
distance to a destination, average traﬃc patterns, road conditions, etc.
4Numerous applications of the RUM to spatial fishing data have appeared in the resource economics
literature. We do not attempt a review of this literature. A special issue of Marine Resource Economics
(Volume 19, Number 1, 2004) is dedicated to analysis of spatial fishing behavior. Smith (2000) provides an
overview of the RUM method for analyzing spatial fishing data.
5Branch et al. (2005) discusses a related problems where the spatial grid used to divide fisheries
geographically–typically latitude and longitude designations determined by political considerations–may
be unrelated to the locations of productive fishing sites.
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to directly predict management-relevant fishing behavior which is crucial for management
purposes.
Estimation procedures that incorporate Kuhn Tucker necessary conditions are common
in the analysis of consumer demand systems, and valuation of non-marketed goods (see
von Haefen, and Phaneuf, 2007 for a review of this literature). Kuhn Tucker estimation is
less common in applied production analysis (an exception is Lee and Pitt, 1987). Whereas
in demand systems consumer utility is not observable, in our fishing profit maximization
problem we observe costs but do not observe the composition of the fish stock at the locations
chosen for fishing. We incorporate species-specific KT necessary conditions for optimal
harvesting, along with the trip-level cost function. Estimating the system of equations
improves parameter identification and directly accommodates the impacts of regulations,
e.g., landing constraints that impact our data.
We choose to use Bayesian methods as they present computational advantages over fre-
quentist methods in both fitting non linear equations and estimating random parameters.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods simulate the posterior but do not maximize
the likelihood function (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). Bayesian estimation approaches are
capable of estimating models for which extremum-based estimators fail to converge. Fur-
thermore in Bayesian frameworks random parameters are accommodated by the appropriate
choice of priors. These hierarchical priors introduce an additional structure in the model
which eases estimation (Chib and Carlin, 1999).6 ,7
Our model allows for random vessel skipper eﬀects. We adopt a hierarchical prior and
use a Metropolis Hasting algorithm to draw from the posterior of our non linear systems of
equations (Kim, et al., 2002).8 Our structural approach unlike Kim, et al. (2002) accom-
modates not only for lower binding constraints, zero harvests, but also for upper binding
6Remark that data augmentation methods (Tanner and Wong, 1987) used for Bayesian inference in RUM
greatly eases the computational burden of these models and can significantly extend the location choice set
considered (see McCulloch and Rossi, 1994 and Imai and van Dyk, 2005).
7While there is no clear advantage in estimating KT systems with either Bayesian or frequentist methods,
in the presence of random parameters the Bayesian methods are often preferred (von Haefen and Phaneuf,
2007).
8The Bayesian inference approach in Kim, et al., (2002) identifies parameters of consumers preferences
for varieties of yogurt. Their procedure remains a reduced form approach because of the absence of data
on consumer preferences and thereby only partially identifies behavioral parameters. On the contrary our
structural model uses data on the cost function for identification.
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constraints on choice variables. In our case the upper-bound constraint is due a per-trip
landings regulations imposed by the fisheries management program. To our knowledge this
paper is the first to incorporate both types of corner solutions.
The next section presents a multiple-factor input, multiple-species behavioral model in
a landings-regulated fishery. Our empirical estimation strategy is also presented. Section
3 presents a brief overview of the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery, the available data and a
discussion of the regulations used to protect reef fish stocks. Section 4 reports results and
demonstrates use of the model for designing regulatory policies. Section 5 summarizes the
main insights of the paper and discusses extensions.
2 Model
We consider a representative, profit maximizing fisherman who harvests from i = 1, ...,m > 1
diﬀerentiated fish stocks. Individual stocks can diﬀer by species, age cohort or sex. Denote
the non-negative harvest vector as h = (h1, ..., hm). The optimization problem is analyzed
in two stages; a cost minimization stage followed by a profit-maximizing harvest choice.
2.1 Multiple-stocks harvest technology
In a fishery, the cost of harvesting h will depend on factor input prices, but also on the
composition, i.e., the absolute and relative abundance of individual fish stocks. We allow
the spatial and temporal distribution of the stocks to be heterogenous. Stock composition
at a particular location and time can vary depending on the spatial-temporal microhabitat.
Abundance at spatial location s ∈ S and date t is denoted xst = (x1,st, ..., xm,st), where xi,st
is stock i abundance, and S is the set of all fishing locations on the fishing ground.9 We
assume that harvest h is small relative to stock abundance and treat xst parametrically.
Date t minimum costs are defined as
c(h,w, xst) = min
v,s
{w0v| v can harvest h given xst, s ∈ S}, (1)
9The spatial location index s may for example, indicate the lattitude, longitude and depth of water
column.
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where v is a vector of factor inputs (e.g., fuel, bait, ice, labor, and capital), that is purchased
competitively at price vector, w > 0. We assume the cost function is convex in h and non-
decreasing, concave and linearly homogeneous in w. These are standard structural properties
of multi-product technologies. Additional structural properties unique to fishing technologies
are discussed next (see Singh and Weninger, 2009 for further details).
Minimizing the cost of harvesting h will in general involve selecting fishing locations
where the composition of the stock is well-suited given the harvest target h. To be more
precise, if a fisherman chooses to harvest a relatively large quantity of stock i fish he will
likely select a location at which xi is abundant in absolute terms and abundant relative to
other stocks. At this location, the fishing gear can be expected to intercept stock i in roughly
the same proportion as the target vector h. Moving vessels and gear across space utilizes
costly inputs. Therefore the fishing location must be optimally chosen jointly with the target
harvests to balance costs and benefits of targeting a particular mix of stocks.
Notice that the optimization problem in (1) is defined over locations s, whereas the spatial
index remains attached to our stock measure, xst. Commercial fishing involves steaming from
port to a preferred location and then returning to port to oﬀ-load and sell the catch. Vessel
operations are mobile and regularly operate from diﬀerent ports. However, each fishing trip
must depart from, and return to some land-based port, and thus the production process
is spatially linked to land.10 Our model allows the costs of accessing a particular stock
composition to diﬀer across coarse regions of the fishing ground.
We assume the technology exhibits the non-standard structural property of weak output
disposibility (Turner, 1995, 1997; Singh and Weninger, 2009). An important implication
of this property is that costs can be non-monotonic in h and specialization, i.e., selecting
a harvest mix with hi = 0 for some i and hj > 0 for j 6= i, can be costly. To see why
this property is reasonable in multiple-stock fisheries, compare the costs associated with the
following harvest vectors. The first, denoted h+, has strictly positive quantities for each
species (h+i > 0, for all i). The second h
0 is identical with the exception that harvest of the
species i stock is zero; h0 = (h+1 , .., h
+
i−1, 0, h
+
i+1, .., h
+
m). Well-suited fishing locations, given
10Researchers have conditioned the location choice on the port from which the vessel departs (Haab et
al., 2008). The choice departure and landing port is likely part of a dynamic optimization problem that is a
topic of future research.
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the target h0, may be quite limited since it is likely diﬃcult, maybe impossible, to avoid
intercepting some stock i when it is present at a location.11 Adjusting factor inputs, e.g.,
changing the mesh size on fishing nets, altering bait and hook configurations, could enhance
gear selectivity and avoid intercepting stock i when it is present at a location. However these
adjustments are expected to be costly.
Next compare the costs of harvesting strictly positive vector h+. It is reasonable that the
subset of fishable locations will expand. More generally, fewer factor inputs will be utilized
in avoiding stock i fish. The implication is c(h+, w, xst) < c(h0, w, xst). Although ultimately
an empirical question, weak output disposibility, or non-monotonicity of the cost function
under stock condition found in most multiple-stock fisheries, is distinctly possible.
Let ci ≡ ∂c(h,w, xst)/∂hi denote the marginal cost of harvesting the species i stock at
(s, t). The weak output disposibility property is summarized with the following condition.
Condition 1 Set hj > 0 for some j 6= i, then ci(h,w, xst) < 0 at harvest quantity hi = 0 is
permitted.
The above condition implies that there can exist a strictly positive harvest quantity at
which marginal cost is zero. Marginal costs are negative at smaller harvests because factor
inputs that would otherwise be used to avoid intercepting stock i are saved. Condition 1
implies that marginal rate of output substitution can be positive over a range of harvest
levels. It is this property that underlies the bycatch problem in fisheries and under certain
regulations provides an incentive to discard fish at sea.
2.2 Targeting behavior
We next consider the profit maximizing harvest choices. In many fisheries harvesting ac-
tivities are subject to stock-specific regulations designed to control total fishing mortality.
Following Singh and Weninger (2009), we assume that regulations are directed at the quan-
tities of fish landed at port. Denote landings and discards of stock i as li ≥ 0 and di ≥ 0,
11If the mix of stocks is distributed homogeneously across the fishing ground, and gear is less than fully
selective, the set of fishable locations with xi,st = 0 and xj,st > 0, j 6= i will be empty and c(h0, w, xst) =∞.
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respectively. It should be emphasized that the minimum cost function in (1) is defined over
harvested fish, h = (l1 + d1, ..., lm + dm).
The regulations we consider are landings constraints that are strictly enforced at the fish
dock. We assume that at-sea harvests are unobserved by the manager and are not subject
to penalty. Let l = (l1, ..., lm) denote the maximum legal landings quantity for stock i fish;
li = 0 simulates a closed harvest season for stock i.
The Lagrangian for the profit maximization problem is given as
L = p · l − c(l + d,w, xst)− λ · (l − l¯), (2)
where p ∈ <m+ is the output price vector and λ ∈ <m+ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers
(vector conformability is assumed). Necessary conditions for optimal landings and discards,
denoted l∗ and d∗, respectively, are given as
pi − ci(l∗ + d∗, w, xst)− λi ≤ 0, if l∗i > 0; λi
¡
l∗i − l¯i
¢
= 0, i = 1, ...,m, (3a)
−ci(l∗ + d∗, w, xst) ≤ 0, d∗i ci(l∗ + d∗, w, xst) = 0, i = 1, ...,m, (3b)
l∗i ≤ l¯i, i = 1, ...,m, di, λi ≥ 0 i = 1, ...,m, (3c)
Suppose that prices at the dock are strictly positive for the moment, and that the landings
constraint does not bind. In this case λ∗ = 0 and the necessary condition in (3a) indicates
the optimal harvest vector satisfies a familiar condition with the price of stock i equal to its
marginal cost. We see also that at h∗ marginal cost is positive (since pi > 0). Equation (3b)
implies therefore that d∗ = 0 or alternatively h∗ = l∗; all harvested fish is landed at port.
Under strictly positive prices and no regulation, discarding is not part of a profit maximizing
fishing strategy (Turner, 1995).
Now suppose one or more landings constraints bind. Consider first an extreme case
where landing stock i is prohibited, l¯i = 0, for example in the case of a stock-specific
closure. Assume fishing remains profitable, i.e., l∗j > 0 for some j. Profit maximization
requires, c∗i = 0 as indicated in (3b). An optimal fishing strategy will involve positive
discards if marginal costs are negative at zero harvest quantity. Under the weak output
disposibility technology it may be less costly to harvest and discard species i fish than take
costly eﬀorts to avoid intercepting it with the fishing gear. The implication is that harvests
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and mortality, unless discarded fish are unharmed, are strictly positive under a stock-specific
landings closure. A final observation is that the behavioral implications for a zero dockside
price and a landings constraint l¯i = 0 are identical.
Notice further that c∗i = 0 from the necessary condition (3a). This implies that λ
∗
i = pi;
the shadow price of the stock i landings constraint is equal to the dockside price.
Next consider the case with l¯i > 0 and suppose the landings constraint binds, l∗i = l¯i.
From (3a) we see that λi > 0 and pi > c∗i . If discards are positive, d∗i > 0, equation (3b)
requires c∗i = 0, and from (3a), we see that λ
∗
i ≥ pi. Alternatively, suppose l¯i > 0 and that
d∗i = 0. Equation (3b) requires c∗i > 0, which occurs at strictly positive harvest level, and
since d∗i = 0 we have 0 < h∗i = l∗i < l¯i. However, if the landing constraint does not bind,
λ∗i = 0, and therefore pi − c∗i = 0.
The remaining sections estimate a parametric cost function consistent with the struc-
tural properties of a costly-targeting technology and the KT necessary conditions for profit-
maximizing harvest behavior.
2.3 Empirical model
We adopt the following empirical cost function for estimation:
c(h,w, s, ϕst|γ, π, β)=
h
1 +
Pm
i=1 γv
¡
θi − ϕi,st
¢2i · g(h,w, s|β). (4)
The function in (4) decomposes cost into targeting costs, which are measured by the first
bracketed term and non-targeting cost, measured by the function g (.). An explanation of
the structure and notation used in each component is presented next.
Targeting costs: Notice first that the stock variable, xst has been replaced with the
vector ϕst = (ϕ1,st, ..., ϕm,st), where ϕi,st ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, ...,m. The vector ϕst is a minimum-
target-cost share vector for location s and date t. The term θi = hi/
Pm
i=1 hi in (4) is
the share of stock i fish in the harvest vector. The parameter, γv ≥ 0 is a targeting cost
parameter for fishermen v. We use V to denote the set of fishermen.
If a fisherman chooses harvest h such that θi = ϕi,st, for all i, the square-bracketed
term in (4) will equal unity, and harvest costs are given as g(h,w, s|β). In this case no
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targeting eﬀorts are necessary to harvest the vector h. This is admittedly a stylized construct,
since explicit separation of costs into targeting and non-targeting components is diﬃcult to
envision in practice. The no-target-cost vector ϕst is simply a means to summarize the
targeting-relevant features of the fish stock at various (s, t) combinations. Notice that if
γv > 0 the term
Pm
i=1 γv
¡
θi − ϕi,st
¢2
increases with the Euclidean distance between θ and
ϕst. Therefore harvesting costs rise with the added eﬀort that is required to harvest a mix
os species that diﬀers from the mix implicit in ϕst.
We allow targeting costs to vary across skippers to allow for heterogeneity in targeting
ability which is likely linked to such factors as skipper experience. The parameter γv measures
the rate at which costs increase for skipper v as the harvest share θ deviates from ϕst.
Non-targeting costs: The function g(h,w, s|β) is assumed to be strictly positive for h >
0, non-decreasing and convex in h, and non-decreasing, concave and linearly homogeneous
in w. For our empirical application to the Gulf reef fish fishery g is specified as
g = exp(β0 + β1h1 + ...+ βmhm + βss+ βsss
2) ·KβKwβw ; (5)
K denotes vessel length and will proxy for the capital endowed to the fishing operation, and
w will hereafter denote the price of fuel.
Inclusion of a proxy for capital reflects the short run nature of the harvest problem that
we analyze below. Prices for other factor inputs such as bait, ice and groceries, could not be
constructed from our data. The crew wage is discussed shortly.
Inclusion of the space index in (5), which we enter quadratically, is intended to capture
non-targeting cost diﬀerences over the fishing ground. Changes in absolute stocks abundance,
fishing depths or crew labor quality across regions of the fishery are examples.
The specification in (5) is convex in individual stock harvest levels if β1, .., βm are positive.
The function is jointly convex in h if
P
i βi > 0. The function g is increasing and concave in
w if βw ∈ (0, 1]. Linear homogeneity could be easily imposed if multiple-input prices were
available. Our data include a single price and therefore the linear homogeneity property is
not considered below. If vessel length is a normal input in the production process, harvest
costs will be non-increasing and concave in K.
Special cases of the multi-stock targeting technology arise under particular values of γv.
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As γv → ∞ the technology exhibits fixed output proportions, i.e., costs become infinite
unless θ = ϕst. This case can represent an harvest technology whereby fishermen cannot
influence the mix of harvested stocks. Independence across harvested stocks occurs if γv = 0
and g(h,w, s|β) is chosen appropriately (see May et al., 1979; Clark, 1990; Boyce, 1996).
A test of the null hypothesis, γv = 0 is therefore a test of the structural property of costly
targeting (weak output disposibility).
Minimum-target-cost share vector: Estimates of stock specific abundance across
space and time is not available in our data, or for any fishery that we are aware of. Therefore
the minimum-target-cost share vector is treated as a latent variable that must be estimated.
We require a parsimonious specification of the vector ϕst. Since s and t are continuous
variables, our state space is infinitely large. A curse of dimensionality must be overcome
in order to summarize the cost impacts of ϕst over space and time. One approach is to
discretize the state space, i.e., divide the fishery into subregions and time intervals and
assume ϕst is constant within each subregion/calendar period combination. This approach
has several flaws: (1) the choice of sub-regions and time intervals requires considerable
information about spatial-temporal habitat variation; (2) there is no reason to expect ϕst
changes abruptly at the spatial and temporal boundaries that are chosen, and (3) the number
of subregion/calendar period combinations, and therefore unique values of ϕst that must be
estimated, is likely to be excessive in most fisheries.
Our approach is to assume that spatial and temporal changes in the composition of the
fish stocks can be represented by a smooth and continuous function of s and t. We adopt
the following functional specification for our estimation:
ϕi,st =
exp(fi(s, t|πi))
1 + exp(fi(s, t|πi)) , i = 1, ...,m. (6)
where πi are parameters to be estimated. The function fi(s, t|πi) ∈ <. The transformation
in equation (6) ensures ϕi,st ∈ [0, 1].12
In our empirical application f is specified as;
fi(s, t, y|πi) = πi,0 + πi,ss+ πi,sss2 + πi,yy + πi,yyy2 + πi,t(t− t2). (7)
12Our assumptions for (6) do not guarantee that
P
i ϕi,st = 1 at each (s, t) combination. This does not
detract from the model’s ability to summarize the minimum targeting costs over space and time.
12
In our empirical application s is a spatial index denoting the geographical subregion of
fishing, and t is the day of the year that a fishing trip begins. The variable y is cumulative
days since the beginning of our data period. The latent stock share model is therefore
capable of capturing spatial and seasonal variation, as well as longer term changes in the
composition of the fish stock. The function in (7) addresses the dimensionality problem; in
our case, characterizing ϕi,st requires that we identify seven parameters for each of the m
fish species/stocks harvested by the fishermen in our data.13 Note also that the specification
in (6) provides a framework to test for spatial and temporal variation in the composition of
the stocks, e.g., tests of the null hypotheses that fi is constant across space or time or both
(i.e., fi(s, t|πi) = πi,0) is easily implemented.
Crew shares: A final consideration is labor remuneration in fisheries data. The lay
system by which hired captains and crew are paid a share of trip revenues is ubiquitous in
marine commercial fisheries. As pointed by McConnell and Price (2004) the lay system can
have implications for fishing behavior. If we denote by ηc the share of trip revenue that is
paid to the crew, variable trip profits in (2) become:
ηpl − c(l + d, w, xst)− λ · (l − l¯).
In the above η = 1− ηc denotes the residual share of the trip revenue that accrues to the
vessel skipper, who we assume is responsible for trip-level harvests decisions. Information on
crew shares in our data is incomplete, and we therefore estimate the parameter η = 1− ηc.
2.3.1 Error structure
We assume that the fishermen in our data are aware of ϕst, i.e., are knowledgeable about
the spatial-temporal composition of the fish stock over the fishing ground.14 The stock
composition is however unobserved by the researcher. Similarly, vessel skipper know their
13Higher-order polynomials and cross terms would increase the flexibility of the model. The added flexi-
bility was deemed to be unnecessary in our application.
Discretizing the state space would be problematic with over 21 subregions and roughly 3.75 years of data.
For example, if we assume stock conditions are constant during each quarter (year) there would be 345 (92)
distinct values of ϕi,st for i = 1, ...,m to be estimated.
14We do not require the assumption that individual fishermen possess knowledge of xst over the entire
fishing ground.
13
own target cost parameter γv. Target costs are unobserved by the econometrician. We
assume γv is distributed normally in our sample with mean γ¯ and variance σ2γ.
γv ∼ N
¡
γ¯, σ2γ
¢
.
The estimating equations of our model include the empirical cost function introduced
in equation (4), and corresponding Kuhn Tucker necessary conditions for optimal targeting.
To simplify notation, we collect the observed data for a representative fishing trip into the
row vector z = [1, h1, ...hm, s, w,K, t, y]. Moreover let A(z|γ, π) = [1 + γv
¡
θi − ϕi,st
¢2
], the
marginal cost of harvesting stock i is given as
ci (z|γv, π, β, ϕ) =
∙
∂A
∂hi
+A
∂g
∂hi
¸
g (.) + εi.
In the above, εi, is an error term associated with KT necessary conditions i = 1, ...,m.
A random term, ε0 which we assume is distributed N(0, σ20) is also appended to our cost
function equation (4). The random vector ε = (ε0, ε1, ..., εm) is assumed normally distributed
with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix Σ.15 Hereafter, σ20 and σ2i will denote the
variance of ε0 and εi, respectively.
The behavioral model introduced above implies the following KT restriction on εi:
Ri =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
εi = ci (z|γv, π, β, ϕ)
εi < ci (z|γv, π, β, ϕ)
εi = ci (z|γv, π, β, ϕ)− ηpi
εi > ci (z|γv, π, β, ϕ)− ηpi
if li = 0 and di > 0
if li = 0 and di = 0
if 0 < li < l¯i
if li = l¯i
.. (8)
We index the trip level observations with subscript n = 1...N . From the KT restrictions
in (8) and our assumptions for the error terms, the likelihood function for Zn = (cn, zn) is
given as
L (Zn|Γ) = φ0
¡
εn0|0, σ20
¢ mY
i=1
Z
Rni
φi
¡
εni|σ2i
¢
dεni,
where Γ = {β, γv, η, π,Σ}, and Rni reflects the regulatory constraint for stock i on trip n.
Letting Z = {Zn}Nn=1 we have the following likelihood for our data
15Specification of a general covariance matrix (e.g., Kim, et al., 2002) is reserved for future work.
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L (Z|Γ) =
NY
n=1
L (Zn|Γ) (9)
3 The Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery
The Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is a complex of bottom-dwelling species consisting of
snappers, groupers, tilefishes, amberjacks, triggerfishes, grunts, porgies, and a host of others.
Reef fish fishermen also intercept coastal pelagic species such mackerel, dolphin (wahoo),
sharks and tuna. The two major gear types in the fishery are vertical hook and line gear
and longline gear. The US portion of the fishery extends from the US border with Mexico in
the western Gulf to the Florida Keys. Figure 1 below shows the 21 subregions of the fishery.
Hereafter subregions 13-21 will be referred to as the western region, and subregions 1-12 as
the eastern region of the reef fish fishery.
The composition of the reef fish stocks varies across western and eastern regions. Groupers
are the most important species, by landed pounds and revenue, in the east, with red and
gag groupers dominating landings and revenue. National Marine Fisheries Service log book
data indicate that red and gag grouper account for 44% of total annual landings, and 50% of
annual revenue in the eastern Gulf region (pounds are reported as gutted weight, and prices,
revenues and costs are in first quarter 2008 US dollars.) The largest volume and revenue
species in the western Gulf region is red snapper which accounts for roughly 49% of the total
landed pounds and 59% of total revenue annually.
3.1 Data
The data available for analysis are from the National Marine Fisheries Service log book
reporting system and a survey of annual operating expenses that was conducted by the
Southeast Fisheries Science Center. Regulations require that following each reef fish trip,
vessel operators record harvests by species, gear type used, primary subregion of fishing,
number of crew on board the vessel and other trip characteristics. In 2003, a “Trip Expense
& Payment Section” was added to the logbook form which recorded revenue by species,
and expenses for fuel, bait, ice, and food. Beginning in 2005, expense and payment data
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Figure 1: The Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery.
collection became mandatory for a stratified sample of the permitted reef fish vessels. A
second stratified sample of reef fish fishermen record discards by species. The data that we
use in our analysis consists of the set of vessel operations that record both expenses and
discards .
Our data are from January, 2005 through August, 2008. There are 1,753 trip-level ob-
servations with complete information on trip expenses and discards. Of these, 75 records
included entries that we deemed to be outliers. Trips that recorded extreme costs per landed
pound were deemed outliers; observations with costs less than $0.04 per pound and in excess
of $2.50 per pound were dropped. Furthermore we removed fishing trip in subregion 12
which corresponds to the New Orleans estuary. Finally we deemed landings of more than
10,000 pounds of one particular species to be non-typical (the average landings of all species
for vertical line gear is 1,854.61 pounds) .Remaining data includes 1,518 vertical line gear
trips and 170 longline trips. The empirical results that follow are for vertical line gear.
Tractability requires that individual reef fish species be aggregated to form output groups.
The four major species harvested include: h1- red snapper; h2- vermilion snapper; h3- red
grouper; and h4- gag grouper. The remaining species were aggregated into output groups
based on similarity in harvesting practices, e.g., fishing locations, depths, bait, and capture
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methods, used to in harvesting.16 This resulted in three additional outputs: h5- Deep water
groupers and tilefishes; h6- Coastal pelagics and sharks, and h7- Other reef fish species.
Descriptive statistics for trip-level costs, prices and harvest per trip are reported in an
appendix.
We take as our spatial index, the coarse geographical region that yielded the bulk of the
each trip’s catch (Figure 1). The index takes the value of 1 on trips taken in the Florida
Keys and 21 for trips taken in waters oﬀ the southern Texas coast. It should be emphasized
that additional and finer-grained information on fishing location (e.g., latitude, longitude
and fishing depth) if available could be incorporated into the model described above. Our
data lists the date that the catch is landed at port. We specify a time index t which indicate
the day of the year that landings are recorded, and an index y which is set equal to the
cumulative days since January 1, 2005; y therefore ranges from 1 through 1,380. We impose
the restriction that the seasonal eﬀect on January 1 equal the eﬀect on December 31 of each
year. Both t and y are normalized to line on the unit interval.
3.2 Regulations
The Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council is responsible for the management of Gulf
reef fish. A host of regulations including vessel entry (fleet size) restrictions, gear and area
restrictions, seasonal closures, per-trip catch limits and recently individual fishing quotas
are used to limit the aggregate harvest of the commercial fleet. Possibly the most regulated
species in the reef fish complex is red snapper. Prior to December 2007 red snapper was
managed under controlled access regulations. Under this system an annual total allowable
catch (TAC) was selected by managers and enforced with fishery closures and a per-trip
endorsement program.17 The endorsement program restricts landings of red snapper on
each fishing trip, during red snapper openings. Vessel operators held either a class 1 permit
16Harvested quantities within each output category are aggregated linearly. The aggregation procedure
assumes that optimal input choices and aggregate output levels can be chosen independently of the mix
of species within each output category. The harvest technology is thus assumed to exhibit weak output
separability. Linear aggregation implies a constant rate of transformation among species within each output
group. These assumptions are consistent with fishing practices as described to us by reef fish fishermen.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that output aggregation could bias the results that follow.
17The red snapper TAC was set at 4.65 million pounds in 2005 and 2006. Stock concerns led to reductions
in the TAC in 2007, to 3.315 million pounds, and a further reduction in 2008, to 2.55 million pounds.
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to land 2,000 pounds per trip, a class 2 permit to land 200 pounds per-trip, or no permit at
all. Vessels that do not own an endorsement permit are prohibited from landing red snapper
at any time.
In an eﬀort to spread the annual red snapper harvest more evenly throughout each year,
red snapper landings were permitted during the first 10 days of each month. When the
cumulative fleet harvest reached the annual TAC, the fishery was closed until the following
year. The implications for fishing behavior during the controlled access management period
(1/1/05-12/31/06) are summarized in the following table.18
Regulation Opt. landings/discards KT necess. cond.
1. li = 0 l∗i = 0, d∗i > 0 c∗i (h∗, x) = 0
2. li = 200 (2, 000) l∗i > 0, d∗i = 0 ηpi − c∗i (h∗, x) ≥ 0
3. li = 200 (2, 000) l∗i > 0, d∗i > 0 c∗i (h∗, x) = 0
Beginning in January 2007 red snapper controlled access regulations were replaced with
individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Under the IFQ program, vessel operators can legally land
any quantity of red snapper as long as they possess quota to cover landings. The IFQ program
was begun by issuing red snapper quota gratis to qualifying fishermen. The amount of quota
that was distributed was based on historical participation, i.e., history of red snapper landings
during designated qualifying years. Therefore, vessels that held class 1 endorsement permits
under the controlled access regime tended to receive larger shares of red snapper IFQ. The
implications for fishing behavior during the IFQ management period (1/1/07-08/31/08) are
summarized in the following table.
Regulation Opt. landings/discards KT necess. cond.
1. li = 0 l∗i = 0, d∗i > 0 c∗i (h∗, x) = 0
2. li =∞ l∗i > 0, d∗i = 0 ηpi − c∗i (h∗, x) ≥ 0
Grouper species are also heavily regulated. Red grouper is managed as part of a shallow
water grouper complex, which includes Black, Gag, Red, Yellowfin, Scamp, Yellowmouth
groupers, Rock Hind and Red Hind. The shallow water grouper fishery is closed when a red
18A minimum size restriction of 15” total length was in place during 2005-06. The length restriction was
reduced to 13” total length in 2007-08.
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grouper TAC of 5.31 million pounds is reached, or when a TAC of 8.80 million pounds for
all shallow water groupers is reached (the closure occurs at the first date either constraint
is met). In addition, measures are used to protect fish during heightened spawning activity.
The red and gag grouper fisheries are closed from February 15 through March 15 of each
year. An aggregate trip limit of 6,000 pounds of shallow water and deep water groupers
combined was introduced for the 2006 fishing season.
Deep water groupers and tilefishes, hereafter DWG, are also managed under controlled
access regulations. Fishermen face a per-trip limit of 6,000 pounds and the fishery is closed
when the annual TAC is reached. The commercial deepwater grouper TAC is currently set
as 1.02 million pounds. The commercial tilefish TAC is currently set at 440,000 pounds.
There are no size limits for deepwater grouper species or tilefish since these fish do not
survive retrieval from the depths in which they are caught. The behavioral implications of
regulations on groupers and other species are summarized in an extended appendix available
from the authors upon request.
4 Results
Tables 2, 3, and 4 of the appendix report median values, standard deviations, and 95%
confidence intervals of the posterior parameter distribution The individual parameter distri-
butions are consistent with our assumptions for the structure of the harvest technology, and
profit maximizing harvest choices under a costly targeting technology.
The results suggests that trip-level costs are increasing and concave in the fuel price;
the posterior median value of βw is 0.504, with 95% confidence interval [0.488, 0.526]. The
posterior distribution for βK has median value 1.119, and 95% confidence interval, [1.095,
1.156]. The result is consistent with trip-level costs that are increasing and convex in vessel
length. At first glance this result seems counterintuitive. One would expect capital to be a
normal input in production. However, larger boats tend to harvest more fish per trip, i.e.,
have a larger hold capacity, which can yield a return to scale. Moreover, larger vessels are
better-able to fish in sever weather conditions. They can harvest more fish annually than
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smaller boats, and therefore incur lower average fixed operating costs.19 This advantage is
not reflected in the trip-level data. It is also possible that our proxy for capital services,
which is a stock variable, does not fully reflect the capital services available for production
on a fishing trip.
The posterior median for γv is 3.090 (c.i. [2.953, 3.247]), and the posterior median for σ2v
is 4.686 (c.i. [3.655, 6.029]). The results indicate considerable variation in targeting ability
across skippers in our data, which is not uncommon in the analysis of harvesting performance
(e.g., Squires and Kirkley, 1999).
The latent harvest share parameters πi are generally well-identified (Table 3 in the appen-
dix). The fitted minimum target cost-shares vectors are reported in in Figure 3, also in the
appendix. Simulations that follow below suggest that the fitted values of ϕst are generally
consistent with landing patterns and available biological information on stock abundance
across space and time. Although it is tempting to view ϕst as an index of absolute stock
abundance, we feel this interpretation is premature.
Finally the posterior median for η is 0.5461 which means that crews receive roughly 45%
of the trip revenue. The posterior median is very close to the value from the log book data;
the median crew share reported in the 2005-08 log book data is 44.21%.
Further interpretation of the results may be best-accomplished by examining their impli-
cations for fishing behavior. Space constraints do not permit a comprehensive demonstration.
The following simulations highlight some of the more interesting aspects of fishing (target-
ing) behavior, and the influence of regulations in the reef fish fishery, that are implied by
our estimation results.
4.1 Simulations
This section reports the results from several simulation exercises. In each simulation we
draw with replacement a random sample of 1,000 vectors from the posterior parameter
distribution.20 For each draw, we use a numerical optimization routine to solve for the profit
maximizing harvest and discard vectors for a representative vessel operation (equation (2)).
19A 1% increase in vessel length correlates with a 3% increase in harvest size per trip.
20We do not incorporate optimization error in our simulations.
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We solve the optimization problem for each subregion of the reef fish fishery thus obtaining
optimal landings and discards for (s, t) combinations, prices p, w and landing restrictions, l.
Variable profits, also quasi-rent to the vessel capital, captain and crew labor shares, marginal
costs etc. are also calculated in our investigation and predictions of fishing behavior.
Our baseline simulation assumes a 40 foot vessel and prices equal to the mean of the
sample data (see Table 1 in the appendix). We impose a per-trip landings of constraint of
5,000 pounds. The date chosen for the baseline simulation is the midpoint of the 2006 fishing
season. Regulations in 2006 included red snapper landing limits under the endorsement
program and closures for grouper species. Our baseline scenario assumes a 2,000 pound red
snapper landings constraint. The eﬀects of a grouper closure are considered separately.
Figure 2: Profits simulations. Solid lines in panels (a)-(c) denote median values, dashed
lines indicate 95% c.i.’s. Panel (a) is per-trip profits on a 10,000 pound summer trip; (b)
is percent change in profit between summer and winter; (c) is percent change in profit with
low red snapper price; (d) is median targeting cost under mean and 25% higher fuel price.
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Panel (a) of Figure 2 reports median variable trip profits (solid lines) and 95% c.i.’s
(dashed lines) under our baseline conditions. Variable profits per trip vary around $5,000-
$7,000 over much of the Gulf. Lowest variable profits are indicated in the far western regions
of the fishery. Red snapper is a key species in the western region, and is the highest priced
among the seven targeted species, averaging $3.19 per pound landed. The 2,000 pound
landings limit however constraints the profit potential for this species.21 If we run the model
without the 2,000 pound limit on red snapper landings, the variable profits flatten out at
roughly $10,000 per trip across all subregions of the fishery.
The model predicts that the 2,000 pound red snapper landings constraint binds in all
subregions of the fishery. In the western and central subregions the remaining 3,000 pounds
of landed fish is made up of vermilion snapper and gag grouper, with a smaller amount
of Other Species landed in subregions 18-21. In eastern subregions a smaller amount of
vermilion snapper is landed and no landings of Other species are recorded. Remaining
landings are comprised largely of gag grouper and red grouper in subregions 3-7. Targeting
of red snapper and gag grouper is explained by the relatively high dockside prices for these
species, which are set a $3.19 and $3.10 per landed pound respectively in the baseline case.
The remaining variation in targeting behavior is due to spatial variation in targeting costs
as measured, as measured by ϕst. The fitted lowest-target-cost share for red snapper exceeds
0.70 in the far western subregions of the fishery, and declines monotonically toward the
eastern subregions. Interaction between the 2,000 pound red snapper landing limit and ϕst
explains the decline in variable profits for s > 14.
The model predicts median red snapper discards that range from 200 pounds in subregion
16 to 550 pounds in subregion 20. Discarding red snapper occurs when optimal harvests
exceed the 2,000 pound landing limit. Under the weak output disposibility technology,
discarding avoids the targeting costs that would otherwise be required to harvest only what
is landed. With fitted values of ϕi,st in western subregions s = 16− 20 well above 0.50 (see
Figure ?? in the appendix), harvesting 2,000 pound of red snapper on a 5,000 pound trip
21Fishing vessels are mobile and we would expect to see only small variation in per-trip profits across
space. The higher returns in the eastern region do not reflect the impacts of periodic grouper closures.
Moreover a vessel with a 200 pound endorsement permits, or no red snapper landings permit will have a
diﬀerent earning profile. Taking these considerations into accout, we can conclude that profit opportunities
do not vary substantially with s..
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requires costly targeting. The model suggesting discarding overages is preferred.
The model predicts fairly substantial discards of Other species, h7 (as high as 1,500
pounds in subregions 1-4). These discards arise because of the per-trip landings constraint
assumed in the baseline simulation. At 5,000 pounds total landings, estimated variable profit
margins for landed species at roughly $1.12 per pound, whereas marginal profits for Other
species is less than $1.
When we simulate harvest behavior without the 2,000 pound red snapper landings con-
straint optimal landings are comprised almost entirely of red snapper. Only in subregions 5-8
are positive landings of gag grouper indicated. Red snapper discards are zero in the absence
of the red snapper landings constraint, although discards of Other species and vermilion
snapper are indicated. It should be emphasized that the predicted discards arise due to the
total trip landings constraint assumed in the baseline model.
Our second simulation examines seasonal eﬀects on harvest behavior and variable trip
profits. We solve for optimal harvests and discards on a trip that originates January 1, 2006.
Prices are unchanged from the baseline levels, and the 2,000 pound limit on red snapper
landings remains in place.
Economic and regulatory conditions are unchanged in the second simulation. The model
predicts diﬀerences in the landings mix, discards, and profits due to the seasonal variation
in the minimum-target-cost harvest vector ϕst. Panel (b) of Figure 2 reports the percentage
diﬀerence in variable profits between a winter and a summer trip, in other words, the gain
from fishing in winter (solid curve denotes the median value and dashed lines indicate 95%
c.i.’s). We find that winter fishing earns slightly lower variable profits in the western subre-
gions, but yields between 2-5% higher profits in the eastern subregions. We also find that
optimal landings mix in the winter includes larger shares of vermilion snapper in the central
subregions and larger shares of gag grouper throughout the Gulf.
Our empirical estimation reveals that ϕi,st for red snapper and gag grouper exhibit sum-
mer troughs or winter peaks. Thus the harvest vector that minimizes targeting costs will
be comprised of larger shares of red snapper and gag grouper during winter fishing. The
model also predicts an increase in the harvest of red snapper. However, under the 2,000
pound landings limit, overages are discarded at sea. The model predicts that in the western
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subregions of the fishery, winter discards of red snapper are 200-700 pounds higher than
during summer fishing.
In a third simulation we reduce the red snapper price by 25% below the baseline value (of
$3.19 per pound). Panel (c) reports the percentage change, decline, in variable profits across
subregions. The results indicate variable profit declines in the range of 14%-18% in western
subregions and 12%-13% in eastern subregions. The mix of landed species is unchanged
in western subregions 13-21. This is explained by the importance of red snapper in the
western Gulf. In the east however the model predicts that a 25% drop in the red snapper
price has important implications for targeting behavior. Under the lower red snapper price,
red snapper landings decline in subregions 1-12. Eastern Gulf fishermen land instead larger
quantities of vermilion snapper, red grouper, and gag grouper. Our model predicts that the
red snapper price decline does not significantly alter discarding behavior.
A fourth simulation considers the eﬀects of a closure of the red and gag grouper fisheries.
Panel (d) in Figure 2 reports the percent profit decline for the case of p3 = p4 = 0. The
results find that the closure policy causes reductions in variable profits vary widely across
subregions. Losses are greatest, in excess of 10%, in subregions 4-9 which is considered to be
the heart of the grouper fishery. Losses are smaller in the central region where shallow water
groupers are a less important target species, and increase again in the western region where
high-priced gag groupers comprise a important share of landings. The results indicate that
when the red and gag grouper fisheries close, landings of vermilion snapper (h2) and deep
water groupers and tilefishes (h5) increase. Not surprisingly, the model predicts positive
discards of red grouper in subregions 5-7, i.e., when red grouper landings are prohibited
fishermen can either incur added costs to avoid them or discard the red grouper intercepted
by their gear.
The results reported above by no means exhaust the economic and regulatory impacts
that can be examined by our model. We consider in a fifth simulation exercise the impact
of an increase in the price of fuel. The annual average fuel price in our data rose from $2.27
in 2005 to $3.75 in 2008, and it is therefore reasonable to expect that fuel prices aﬀected
the reef fish targeting behavior in our data. The simulations find that a 40% fuel price
increase reduced per-trip variable profits by 5%-10% relative to baseline levels. The model
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predicts that higher fuel prices impact targeting behavior. We find that the median targeting
cost component,
h
1 +
Pm
i=1 γv
¡
θi − ϕi,st
¢2i
decline by 2%-5% depending on the subregion
under the higher fuel price. Intuitively, targeting eﬀorts will be dampened under higher
fuel prices and the optimal harvest share will more closely mirror the minimum-target-cost
vector ϕst. This is because adjusting the harvest mix in response to price diﬀerentials at the
dock becomes more costly when the fuel price rises. Our simulations indicate, for example,
that landings of gag are reduced by 200-300 pounds across the fishery. Landings of vermilion
snapper increase primarily in the central subregions and landings of red grouper increase
under in subregions 2-7. The model predicts, also rather intuitively, that at-sea discards
decline under high fuel prices.
Recall that the empirical specification for ϕst includes a time index y to capture longer
term trends in stocks conditions in the fishery. This allows us to examine longer term trends
in targeting behavior. Simulations that varied y for example, from 2005 through 2008,
indicated only minor changes in variable profits and targeting behavior. The results are not
reported here.
We construct a final simulation to examine the changes in fishing behavior that accompa-
nied a switch from controlled access to individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for red snapper.
To represent this policy switch we introduce a quota user cost which we assume arbitrarily
to be equal to 50% of the baseline red snapper price, and drop the 2,000 pound landing con-
straint. Under ITQs trip limits on landings are no longer required; landings are restricted
only at the seasonal level by the aggregate ITQ holdings of the vessel operation. We evaluate
optimal harvests and discards for a mid 2007 season trip, which was the first year of the red
snapper ITQ program.
First, the results indicate a reduction in trip variable profits ranging from 15% in eastern
subregions and increasing to 33% in western subregions.22 The reduction in variable profits
or capital quasi rents conforms with theoretical predictions, that property rights-based man-
agement programs provide incentives to reduce oversized fishing fleets. An important results
for managers, however relates to the stark variability in losses across regions. Because tar-
22Looses in variable profits are oﬀset by increases in resource rents generated under the red snapper ITQ
program. These rents would be determined as the quota rental times the total red snapper landings.
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geting costs vary across subregions, substitute target species and red snapper fishing costs do
as well. Our model suggests that introducing ITQ for a single species in a multiple-species
fishery can significantly alter harvests and discards of species managed under the status
quo. In particular, our model predicts that red snapper landings increase above the 2,000
pounds in the far western subregions. Vermilion snapper landings also increase in subregions
10-17 where these two species tend to be harvest complements. The addition of the red
snapper quota rental substantially lowers the residual price for fishermen at the dock. Our
model predicts that eastern landings of red snapper fall to zero when a quota rental is in-
troduced; optimal landings instead include substantially higher shares of vermilion snapper,
gag grouper and red grouper.
A less anticipated impact on fishing behavior is a predicted increase in red snapper
discards. Results indicate positive red snapper discards in subregions 7-16, ranging from 150
pounds per trip to over 1,000 pounds per trip (subregions 13 and 14). This result is due to
the 5,000 pound per-trip landings constraint. At a substantially reduced red snapper price
and a 5,000 pound trip limit on landings, the marginal profit from landing red snapper falls
below marginal profits from landing other species such as vermilion snapper and red and gag
groupers.
5 Conclusions
We have introduces a new approach for studying spatial-temporal fishing behavior in marine
fisheries. We estimate a structural behavioral model that provides a direct link from the in
situ fish stock, prices and species-specific regulations, to outcomes of interest to managers,
e.g., species-specific harvests, discards and fishing profits. A parametric cost function and
Kuhn Tucker necessary conditions for profit maximizing targeting of multiple fish species
under landings restrictions is specified for estimation. Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods
are used to simulate the posterior likelihood function. We estimate a latent, lowest-target-
cost harvest share vector that summarizes the costly targeting technology and corresponding
profit opportunities for fishermen across space and time. The fitted model is used to pre-
dict the eﬀects of changes in economic conditions and regulations on spatial and temporal
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landings, discards, and fishing profits in the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery.
Our results demonstrate complex interactions between the economic and regulatory en-
vironment and the multiple-species harvesting behavior of Gulf reef fish fishermen. Not
surprisingly, we find that per-trip landings limits used to control aggregate fishing mortal-
ity redirect fishing eﬀort toward unregulated species, in pattern that vary spatially with
stock conditions. We are also able to investigate the eﬀects of model fundamentals on the
incentives to discard fish at sea.
Several policy lessons emerge from our analysis of the Gulf reef fish fishery. For example,
replacing controlled access management with individual fishing quotas for a single species,
is likely to redirect eﬀort toward species without a quota rental, and may enhance incentives
to discard fish at sea. We also find, not surprisingly, that closures for individual species
cause fishermen to substitute toward unregulated species, and can enhance incentives to
discard fish. Less obvious findings relate to the impact of increased fuel prices on targeting
and discard behavior. Our model predicts that when the price of fuel rises, Gulf reef fish
fishermen may be inclined to target higher priced species, and more willing to land a mix
of species that moderates targeting costs. On the flip side, targeting is enhanced and at-sea
discards will increase when fuel prices decline. Overall the results demonstrate the need to
consider behavioral responses and policy design inclusive of the complete biological, economic
and regulatory environment of marine fisheries.
An important attribute of our model is that optimal responses of fishermen to varying
economic and other regulatory conditions is incorporated explicitly. Our results demonstrate
clearly the benefits of a structural approach for policy analysis. Moreover, because we are
able to link fishing behavior directly to stock conditions, prices and regulations, the model
is ideally suited to investigate ex ante impact of alternative forms of regulations. Methods
based on the discrete choice RUM framework require a second layer model to complete the
link from fundamentals to trip-level behavior. Our approach avoids discretizing the fishing
ground and/or the choice set of fishing inputs and outputs; our approach provides a rich
framework to characterize fishing behavior at any spatial or temporal scale. Taken together
these attributes suggest that our model can be a powerful tool to improve the design of
fisheries management policies.
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For example, our model can guide the design of fishery closure policies, property rights-
based management, marine reserves, etc. Designing a system of marine reserves requires
knowledge of trade-oﬀs between ecological preservation across a spatially heterogeneous fish-
ing ground and pursuit of economic rents. Our model measures directly, the short term cost,
or foregone profits of closing subregions of a fishery. A useful extension of our model would
link our costly targeting technology, and our lowest-target-cost share vector, to measures of
absolute stock abundance. This would allow a fully dynamic analysis of spatial behavior and
spatial management policies. Evaluating changes in stock abundance in areas surrounding
marine protected areas, and stock eﬀects due to large scale redistribution of fishing eﬀort
across space and time are examples.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Prior specifications
With the exception of the targeting skill parameter, all priors are assumed to be diﬀused. A
hierarchical prior captures heterogeneity in fishing skill. We assume
γv ∼ N
¡
γ¯, σ2γ
¢
.
Following standard methods (e.g., Chib and Carlin, 1999) we use conventional conjugate
priors for the hyperparameters of this distribution, i.e.,
σ2γ ∼ IG (2.5, 3) ,
γ¯ ∼ N (0, 1000) ;
in the above IG(.) and N(.) denote the inverse gamma and normal distribution, respectively.
7.2 Random Walk M-H Algorithm
Here we simply present the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings (RWMH) algorithm. For
further details on the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm we refer the reader to (Chib, and
Greenberg, 1995). The M-H algorithm is similar in spirit to acceptance/rejection sampling
and consists in three steps:
1. At iteration ω, sample a candidate value for the parameters from a candidate density
q∗ω ∼ δ (q|qω−1)
2. Draw a random number u such that
u ∼ U (0, 1)
3. Accept or reject the candidate based on the following decision rule. Let
a =
φ (q∗ω|.) δ (qω−1|q∗ω)
φ (qω−1|.) δ (q∗ω|qω−1)
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where φ (q|.) denotes the posterior distribution of q according to the data. Then if u ≤ a,
set qω = q∗ω otherwise qω = qω−1.
In the RWMH algorithm the candidate density is normal so that
q∗ω ∼ N
¡
qω−1, σ2q
¢
.
In the above, σ2q is the variance os spread of the normal distribution. The main idea
behind the M-H algorithm is to replicate the stationary property of the Markov chain.
Indeed a can be interpreted as the "jump" probability from one candidate to the next. This
probability is pending on the value of the spread. The art of the RWMH algorithm dwells
in setting the value of this spread. We follow the recommendation of Gelman and Gilks
(1995) and specify the spreads of our candidate generating density so that the acceptance
rate is close to 50 percent for single valued parameters and between 25 and 50 percent for
multi-valued parameters.
7.3 Estimation algorithm
We use a Gibbs sampler to simulate draws from the posterior of the joint posterior density.
The following algorithm describes the procedure.
Using the Gibbs sampler we repeatedly cycle through each conditional density, drawing
from each one in turn. When the number of cycles grows large, the draws converge in
distribution to that of the complete joint posterior (Gelfand and Smith, 1990). Our Gibbs
sampler consists of seven steps or "blocks".
Step 1: β|Γ−β, Z As this posterior conditional is of unknown form we use the RWMH
algorithm explained above. For further reference Γ−β indicates the entire set of parameters
less the parameter β.
Step 2: Σ|Γ−Σ, Z. Likewise the form of the conditional posterior for Σ is unknown. We
again use the RWMH algorithm to draw from this unknown posterior.
Step 3: γv|Γ−γj , Z The vector of vessel specific skills is drawn using a RWMH algorithm.
Unlike other parameters the prior on these parameters is non diﬀuse. Hence the value of
the prior has to be accounted for in computing the acceptance probability (see Kim, et al.,
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2002).
Step 4: σ2γ|γv, γ¯. Given our conjugate prior for σ2γ|γv, γ¯, the posterior conditional follows:
σ2γ|γv, γ¯ ∝ IG (c, d) ,
where,
c = 2.5 + V
d =
"
1
3
+
1
2
VX
v
(γv − γ¯)0 (γv − γ¯)
#−1
.
Recall V denotes the number of skippers.
Step 5: γ¯|γv, σ2γ. The conditional posterior of γ¯ follows
γ¯|γv, σ2γ ∝ N (Dγdγ, Dγ) ,
with
Dγ =
£
V/σ2γ + (1000)
−1¤−1
and
dγ =
VX
v
γv/σ
2
γ.
Step 6: π|Γ−π, Z. These coeﬃcients are drawn using a RWMH step.
Step 7: η|Γ−η, Z. For this parameter we also use the RWMH step. Since η enters
multiplicatively a change of variable is requried.
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Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Var. costs (non-labor) 799.89 700.05 20.43 3,997.43
Red snapper (p1) 3.19 0.28 1.61 4.03
Verm. snapper (p2) 2.40 0.15 1.70 3.14
Red grouper (p3) 2.42 0.18 1.94 2.91
Gag grouper (p4) 3.10 0.21 2.55 3.80
DWG/Tilefishes (p5) 2.32 0.32 0.83 3.42
Coastal pelagic/sharks (p6) 1.76 0.33 0.16 3.42
Other species (h7) 1.81 0.64 0.51 4.68
Fuel price 2.67 0.66 1.47 5.08
Vessel length 35.66 9.26 20 67
Red snapper (h1) 469.39 1,243.46 0 16,131.80
Verm. snapper (h2) 280.13 814.43 0 6,395.21
Red grouper (h3) 366.06 768.97 0 8,619.08
Gag grouper (h4) 157.30 472.25 0 6,921.44
DWG/Tilefishes (h5) 69.83 385.25 0 6,917.91
Coastal pelagic/sharks (h6) 78.56 382.02 0 4,000.00
Other species (h7) 406.34 767.30 0 9,024.62
Total trip harvest 1,854.61 2,102.17 31.60 17,267.73
Table 1: Sample data descriptive statistics. Table reports mean, standard deviation
(Std. dev.) minimum and maximum values for the sample data. There are
1,508 observations on 149 separate vessels.
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Variable description Parm. Median Std. dev. 95% c.i.
Constant β0 -2.292 0.021 [-2.334, -2.253]
Fuel price βw 0.504 0.009 [0.488, 0.526]
Vessel length βK 1.119 0.015 [1.095, 1.156]
Sub-region βs 1.170 0.012 [1.146, 1.194]
Sub-region2 βss -0.080 0.019 [-0.116, -0.037]
Red snapper β1 0.109 0.004 [0.102, 0.116]
Verm. snapper β2 0.132 0.008 [0.120, 0.148]
Red grouper β3 0.251 0.007 [0.239, 0.265]
Gag grouper β4 0.249 0.012 [0.220, 0.269]
DWG/Tilefishes β5 0.231 0.010 [0.208, 0.245]
Coastal pelagic/sharks β6 0.269 0.011 [0.246, 0.291]
Other species β7 0.138 0.007 [0.126, 0.153]
Crew shares η 0.546 0.005 [0.536, 0556]
Targ. cost (mean) γ¯ 3.090 0.074 [2.953, 3.247]
Targ. cost. (var.) σ2γ 4.686 0.603 [3.655, 6.029]
Table 2: Posterior parameter distribution. Table reports the median, standard
deviation (Std. dev.) and 95% confidence intervals of the posterior
parameter distribution.
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Red. snp. Verm. snp. Red grp. Gag grp.
Const.
-2.415
[-2.670,-2.197]
-29.515
[-31.359, -26.999 ]
-4.619
[-5.529, -4.028]
-8.419
[-9.905, -6.904]
s
3.606
[2.882, 4.645]
118.057
[107.384, 126.184]
39.112
[33.940, 45.253]
52.150
[42.046, 61.485]
s2
0.919
[-0.005, 1.714]
-122.049
[-131.372, -110.715]
-85.761
[-96.180, -73.394]
-86.897
[-103.396, -72.352]
y
0.635
[0.323, 1.036]
0.619
[0.339, 0.925]
0.227
[-0.056, 0.556]
-1.118
[-1.346, -0.739]
y2
-0.960
[-1.263, -0.397]
0.524
[0.098, 0.936]
0.182
[-0.368, 0.752]
0.464
[-0.081, 0.850]
t− t2 -3.305
[-3.683, -2.864]
3.151
[2.601, 3.599]
1.710
[1.210, 2.639]
-2.706
[-3.179, -2.035]
DWG/Tile. CP/Sharks Other
Const.
-5.868
[-10.125, -4.739]
-4.709
[-5.114, -4.291]
1.299
[1.110, 1.449]
s
1.522
[0.766, 2.698]
0†
[0,0]
-10.484
[-11.355, -9.085]
s2
0†
[0,0]
0.343
[0.000, 0.731]
7.974
[6.500, 9.059]
y
1.491
[0.703, 2.240]
-0.300
[-0.937, 0.725]
-0.566
[-0.870, -0.366]
y2
-2.248
[-5.351, -1.131]
0.199
[-0.774, 0.812]
0.104
[-0.199, 0.433]
t− t2 8.464
[3.315, 24.927]
4.980
[3.802, 6.740]
-0.683
[-1.124, -0.161]
Table 3: Posterior parameter distribution: Latent stock share model Table reports
median values, and 95% confidence intervals (in square brackets). † - a
value of zero was imposed during estimation.
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Equation Parm. Median 95% c.i.
Cost equation σ20 0.512 [0.485, 0.543]
Red snapper σ21 1.009 [0.967, 1.058]
Verm. snapper σ22 2.365 [2.168, 2.516]
Red grouper σ23 1.017 [0.973, 1.061]
Gag grouper σ24 1.347 [1.269, 1.407]
DWG/Tilefishes σ25 0.765 [0.735, 0.794]
Coastal pelagic/sharks σ26 3.247 [2.945, 3.561]
Other species σ27 1.009 [0.964, 1.059]
Table 4: Posterior parameter distribution: Variance matrix. Table reports the median,
and 95% confidence intervals of the posterior parameter distribution.
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Figure 3: Panels (a)-(f) report the median values (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals
for ϕi,st where s = 1− 21, and t is the midpoint of the 2006 fishing season.
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